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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
AMENDMENT OF THE STATUTE AND NEW
INTERNATIONAL LAW
J. F. O'CONNOR*
The International Court of Justice, in accordance with its statu-
tory authority,' has for the first time submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations a proposal to amend its statute. The
supporting memorandum 2 explains the Court's proposed amendment
to article 22, which now provides that the seat of the Court shall be
established at The Hague. Since 1966 the Government of the Nether-
lands has had under consideration a proposal that a new building be
erected for the Court, and the Court does not want to confine the
choice of location to The Hague itself. Even another location in the
Netherlands outside the municipal limits of The Hague could not be
contemplated unless the statute of the Court is amended.
It is clear that the proposed change is not entirely due to the town
planning situation at The Hague. The memorandum sets forth "other
reasons" and in particular that an amendment is desirable because the
particularity of the provision that "the Seat of the Court shall be
established at The Hague" is invidious. No other principal organ of
the U.N. and none of the Specialized Agencies, or the IAEA, is
compelled by its basic instrument to maintain its seat in a designated
place.
The reason for this particular designation in the basic instrument
of the Court is primarily historical. The Court's predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice, was subject to the same
restriction.3 The location of the Permanent Court at The Hague in
1922 is understandable. The Hague had become associated with the
judicial settlement of international disputes through the work of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration established there by The Hague Con-
ventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899
and 1907. Also, the emotive association of The Hague with peace
since the Conferences of 1899 and 1907 was a potent factor in the post
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World War I atmosphere. In addition, the desirability of separating
the political functions of the League of Nations, based in Geneva, and
the judicial functions of the Court, contributed to the decision to
locate the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.
Apart from the practical convenience of locating the new Interna-
tional Court of Justice in the building occupied by its predecessor,
there was no reason why the new Court should not have been insti-
tuted in a new seat. The, decision to establish a new Court, rather than
to adapt the existing Permanent Court, was taken after considerable
deliberation4 with political factors contributing largely to the deci-
sion.5 The emphasis was on the new Court forming an integral part
of the United Nations, 6 in contrast to the formal separation of the
Permanent Court and the League, which could have led naturally to
a decision to establish the new Court elsewhere than at The Hague.
However, there was a marked desire to preserve legal continuity with
the old Court, and in the charter itself the nexus is recognized in
article 92 which states that the Statute of the International Court is
based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court.
The close similarity in statutes, the organization and the continu-
ance of the new Court in the seat of the old have all contributed to
the close identification of the two institutions, and the judges of the
International Court have reinforced this identification by emphasiz-
ing the continuity in jurisprudence of the Courts.' These factors and
the laudable desire to preserve the independence of the International
Court as a judicial organ have to some extent obscured the essential
fact that the new Court is a principal organ of a political institution.
The reasons given for the proposed change are open to question.
Indeed, as Professor D.H.N. Johnson observed in a preliminary com-
ment on the proposal,' it is difficult, with the information presently
available, to tell what the Court really has in mind. It is clear, how-
ever, that the Court recognizes the fundamental changes that have
4. The question was discussed in Subcommittee IV/I/A San Francisco Conference 1945,
and the reasons for the decision were given in the Report of the Subcommittee to Commission
IV. Doc. 913, IV/I/74(l), 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 381 (1945).
5. I S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 36(1965).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 7:92.
7. For examples see Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania,
[1950] I.C.J. 65, 71-72; id. at 233 (dissenting opinion of Read, J.); Corfu Channel Case (Merits),
[1949] I.C.J. 4, 24; H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 11 (1958).
8. Johnson, Recent Developments in the International Court ofJustice, 33 MODERN L. REV.
53, 61 (1970).
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occurred in the framework of international society since the institu-
tion of the Permanent Court. The Court's announcement includes the
following paragraph:
Since 1922, changes in world conditions have affected the relative signifi-
cance for the operations of the International Court of Justice, of The Hague
and of other places. The special qualities attached to The Hague in 1922 are
less distinctive now, and the importance of other places as legal centers has
been enhanced.'
The emphasis here on "other" places seems to suggest that the Court
is not simply contemplating a minor move outside The Hague, but
preparing the ground for possible abandonment of Europe altogether
as a center for its activities. The symbolic significance which such a
removal would have is aptly summarized by Professor Johnson:
What could more effectively symbolise, for instance, the substitution of a "new
international law" for the system of European origin that at present exists than
the eviction of the highest international tribunal from the homeland of Grotius?
Symbols are not without importance, and this seemingly innocent proposal
may conceal an intention to bring the administration of international justice
down into the political arena. I"
A simple explanation for the proposal is that the Court wishes
formally to recognize the emergence of the many new subjects of
international law in Africa and Asia." There is no evidence that the
judges of the Court themselves wish to leave Europe, and it is diffi-
cult to suggest an alternative seat which would receive widespread
immediate acceptance. Apart, therefore, from the desirability of
marking the universality of the Court and bringing the designation
of its seat into line with the other organs of the U.N., the proposed
amendment at this time seems to have little significance.
However, any suggestion of a possible rejection of the "Euro-
pean" basis of international law and a "descent" by the Court into
the political arena raises serious questions for the future of the Court
and the fragile hopes for a strengthening and extension of the system
of judicial settlement of international disputes. Such a suggestion
considered against the background of recent events touching the
Court acquires added significance; it is, therefore, not surprising that
9. [1968-1969] I.C.J.Y.B. 109.
10. Johnson, 33 MODERN L. REv., supra note 8, at 61.
II. It has been suggested that the remoteness of the Court from non-European countries
may account, to some degree, for the lack of recourse to the Court by African and Asian States.
See Anand, Role of the "New" Asian African Countries in the Present International Legal
Order. 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 383,403 & nn. 95-96 (1962).
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when the proposal came before the General Assembly the opportunity
was taken to initiate a review of the role of the Court generally."
The 1966 judgment on South West Africa, the last election of
judges, and, most recently, the Advisory Opinion on the Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, delivered in June, 1971, have created an unprecedented cri-
sis of confidence in the Court. In such a situation the proposed
amendment of article 22, while perhaps useful for minor practical or
symbolic reasons, will seem to many to be much less important for
the future of the Court than other possible and more far reaching
amendments. One such amendment, a reformulation of the
"Sources" of international law contained in article 38 is suggested
below in this article, and can be achieved without proposing an ideal-
istic and impractical "new" source of international law. More impor-
tant, it can be achieved with an acknowledgement of the political
function of the Court while preserving its judicial independence. One
of the greatest defects of the present statute is that, while it stresses
in article I that the Court is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations, it does not, in article 38 or elsewhere, make clear that the
international law which the Court must apply today includes interna-
tional custom as collectively generated in the United Nations and
other international bodies. An explicit acceptance of this source of
international law in the statute would enable the Court to perform its
necessary political role in the true sense without descending into
"mere" politics and without compromising its judicial function. It
would also help to minimize the undesirable emphasis on the national-
ity and political affiliations of individuals in the elections of judges
of the Court.
The United Nations and "New" International Law
The rapid and dramatic changes in the composition and character
of international society and the difficulties which these changes have
created for the evoliation of international law have been noted by
12. The General Assembly decided on Dec. 8, 1970, to postpone considerhition of the pro-
posal until the 26th (present) Session. By Resolution 2723 (XXV), of Dec. 15, 1970, states were
invited to submit by July 1, 1971, views and suggestions concerning the role of the Court on
the basis of a questionnaire to be prepared by the Secretary-General. The date for submissions
was extended to July 1, 1972, and the proposal to amend article 22 and the review of the role
of the Court will not now be considered before next session.
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modern writers. 13 The small club of European states who shared gen-
erally similar political, moral and legal ideas has grown into an inter-
national community of 130 sovereign states with a wide diversity of
political, social and economic systems, subjecting international law to
a number of dilemmas: it continues to operate with concepts which
originated and developed in a totally different environment; unlike
municipal legal systems, there is no legislature to reform and up-date
the law to accord with developments in international society; and
unlike municipal legal systems, international law-determining agen-
cies-foremost among these, the International Court of Justice-are
not assisted in their function of developing the law to accord with
developments in international society because the society in question
lacks the homogeneity generally found within states.
The general structural framework within which international law
operates is further complicated by certain features of organized inter-
national society. The United Nations, pre-eminent in that society,
reflects the changed world order. Its origin is closely linked to the era
of international relations marked by hegemonial, political power."
Since the U.N.'s foundation, however, the then already crumbling old
order has rapidly disintegrated, making attempts to describe interna-
tional law in traditional terms increasingly difficult. Also, the socio-
political basis on which international relations rested has been largely
rejected by newly emerged states, and some traditional rules of inter-
national law are being directly challenged. 5
The new states, many of whom are included in the new world
bloc-the so-called "Third World"' 6-tend to regard many of the
13. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); C. DE
VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 162-63, 404-06 (rev. ed. P.
Corbett transl. 1968).
14. The Moscow Declaration, Oct. 30, 1943, confirmed the agreement of the United States,
Soviet Union, United Kingdom and China, to establish such a world organization. At the
Dumbarton Oaks Conference it was assumed that agreement between these great powers was
essential to the success of the United Nations. L. GOODRICH & A. SIMONS, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 11-12 (1955).
15. For example, a particularly controversial area is the problem of the "minimum stan-
dard" and the standard of national treatment in cases of expropriation of foreign property
interests. See W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 13, at 318-20; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1969) (especially pages 7-11) (discussing the problem).
See generally G. WHITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1961).
16. African and Asian States predominate in membership of the Third World, but it is not
an exclusively Afro-Asian or non-white alliance. Predominantly white states in Europe (e.g.,
Yugoslavia) and South American states (e.g.. Argentina and Uruguay) may also be considered
part of the Third World. See Preiswerk, Race and Colour in International Relations, in 1970
Y.B. WORLD AFF. 63.
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rules in modern international law as the exclusive work of five or six
great pow ers. Furthermore, they consider that a number of these rules
owe theii origins to duress or illegality-in particular, those rules
which justify racial discrimination, conquest, annexation and coloni-
zation. 7
It thus becomes easier to understand the fears of a broad range of new States
in three continents, who dispute the legitimacy of certain rules of international
law, not only because they were adopted without them, but also because they
do not seem to them to correspond to their legitimate interests, to their essential
needs on emerging from the colonialist epoch, nor, finally, to that ideal of
justice and equity to which the international community, to which they have
at long last been admitted, aspires. What the Third World wishes to substitute
for certain legal norms now in force are other norms profoundly imbued with
the sense of natural justice, morality and humane ideals.",
Ironically, the great powers who once dictated the content of inter-
national law and who rejected proposals to confer power on the Gen-
eral Assembly to legislate"9 have themselves largely accelerated
changes which may militate against them. The ideological conflict of
the "Super Powers" and their concomitant political postures have
involved them with small and even mini-states; the influence of me-
dium and small powers has grown accordingly."0 In the United Na-
tions, the ideological conflict having largely stultified the original
concept of the influence of the Security Council, the power and influ-
ence of the General Assembly has increased. This influence extends
into the sphere of international law.
In particular, the "new" international law received a powerful
impetus from the changing composition and character of the General
Assembly. Judge Alvarez saw new international law, which he termed
"the law of social interdependence," as the outcome of the realities
of international life and the product of the "juridical conscience of
the nations."'z The General Assembly pre-eminently provides a voice
17. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, [19701 I.C.J. 309.
18. Id. at 310.
19. One such proposal at the San Francisco Conference (by the Phillipines) is referred to
by Judge Ammoun in his Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Case, [1970] I.C.J. 302,
20. Professor R.L. Rothstein in a recent work examines the paradox that while the relative
strength of small states (measured in traditional capabilities) has declined, their status and
actual power appear to have increased. R. ROTHSTEIN, ALLIANCES AND SMALL POWERS (1968).
21. Advisory Opinion on Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4),
[1947-48] I.C.J. 69 (opinion of Alvarez, J.). "New international law" is mainly associated with
the late Judge Alvarez, whose advocacy of it commenced after World War I and continued after
his election to the International Court in 1946.
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for this "juridical conscience of the nations." At no time in the
history of the world has there been such a forum for the expression
of near-universal views on a wide range of issues. The General Assem-
bly, for example, in the following resolutions has declared the collec-
tive voice of the nations of the world:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights;"
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and Peoples;23
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources; 24
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation. 25
It is not proposed here to elaborate on the above' or to consider
the legally binding effect, per se, of these "declaratory" resolutions
of the General Assembly.27 What is clear, however, is that these and
similar exercises in the international community are providing an
ethical and political basis for new international law comparable to the
Christian/European basis of traditional international law. The im-
portance of this for the future of international law lies in the essential
connection between law and the context in which it operates.
It is evident that municipal legal systems originate in and operate
within political settlements. Formal constitutional provisions clothe
these settlements with abstract and high-sounding principles; once
accepted-a political accomplishment-the integrated and homoge-
neous nature of normal states permits constitutional machinery, in-
22. U.N. Doc. A/811 (adopted Dec. 10, 1948); G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948). The voting was 48 for, 0 against, 8 abstentions.
23. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (adopted Dec.
14, 1960). The voting was 89 for, 0 against, 9 abstentions.
24. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (adopted Dec.
14, 1962). The voting was 87 for, 2 against, 12 abstentions.
25. G.A. Res. 1904, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (adopted unani-
mously Nov. 20, 1963). This resolution was one of the precursors of the International Conven-
tion adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 21, 1965, as annex to G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc A/6014 (1965).
26. For convenient texts, notes and references to further works, see I. BROWNLIE, BASIC
DocUMaENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967).
27. See Sloan, The Binding Force of a Recommendation of the General Assembly of the
U.N., 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. I (1948). For a criticism of Sloan's view see Johnson, The Effect
of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the U.N., 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97 (1955-56). See
also Cheng, International Law in the U.N., 1954 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 170; and, for judicial views,
see Advisory Opinion on S.W. Africa, Voting Procedure [1955] I.C.J. 67, 118-19 (opinion of
Lauterpacht, J.): S.W. Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 323, 432 (dissenting opinion
of Jessup, J.).
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cluding the separation of legislative and judicial functions, to operate.
The greater the degree of willing acceptance of the constitution in a
state, with consequent stability of political institutions, the greater the
emphasis which can be laid on the functional separation of Parlia-
ment, the Executive and the Courts. In time, this separation leads to
the effective fiction that the law, and in particular the operation of
the Courts, is "above" politics. The protected and privileged position
often accorded to judges reinforces the fiction. Emphasis on funda-
mental rights and legal machinery for protection of the individual
contributes to the "mystique" of the law as a superior order to the
cynicism and opportunism of "mere" politics." The practical advan-
tage of this idea is considerable and the beneficient effect of "the rule
of law" thus achieved is undeniable.
But in practice municipal law performs a necessary political func-
tion by adverting to realities. Judges play a major part in adapting
the law to changing social or political needs.2" Where cases raise,
directly or indirectly, controversial political issues, judges are not
absolved from their duty. Inevitably they must accept criticism that
particular decisions were animated by political or social prejudice."
The political basis of international law and the political function
of its highest judicial organ, the International Court of Justice, is even
more apparent. This is most clearly seen in the nomination and elec-
tion of judges of the International Court.
The dissatisfaction with the system of nomination and election,
which unduly emphasizes the political factors involved in the election
of judges, has been increasing.3' Both in the Permanent Court and in
the International Court the system was intended to protect the inter-
ests of the great powers, and presently it continues to do so to the
extent of virtually guaranteeing that the permanent members of the
Security Council will have their nationals on the Bench. However, the
changes which have occurred in international society generally, and
which are reflected in the General Assembly, are also reflected in the
28. In times of national crisis the political reality behind the law emerges clearly in the
suspension of normal legal processes, the use of emergency powers, special courts, etc.
29. See generally W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THsEORY ch. 32 (5th ed. 1967).
30. In the U.K., for example, the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Bernard,
[1964] A.C. 1129, provoked particularly strong criticism. Its effect on trade union activities was
largely nullified, under union pressure, by the passing of The Trade Disputes Act 1965. The U.S.
Supreme Court has also attracted widespread criticism for its decisions on cases with sensitive
political and social implications, e.g.. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. S. ROSENNE, supra note 5, at 184-90.
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pattern of elections to the International Court.
In the last election,3 2 for example, the shadow of the Seventh
Assembly of the Organization of African Union3 3 was evident. The
Assembly had adopted a resolution demanding increased African rep-
resentation on the Court which had only two African judges; subse-
quently all thirty-nine African states strongly supported the candi-
dacy of M. Ignacio Pinto of Dahomey who was duly elected. This
solidarity produced a Court in which the Third World, as a relatively
cohesive block, is strongly represented. In addition to the three Afri-
can judges, the Court now includes two judges from Asia, one from
the Middle East, and two from South America.34
This is not an undesirable political development and provides evid-
ence of the erosion of the once predominantly "European" character
of the Court. This development is to be welcomed in an organ which,
if it is to retain credibility, must reflect fairly the universality of its
parent body. Unfortunately, the background to the election and the
subsequent involvement of the Court in yet another South West Af-
rica case may increase the tensions between "old" and "new" inter-
national law, and does increase the danger that the Court may not be
permitted to realize its great potential in helping to resolve these
tensions.
The emergence of a substantial group of judges with a new ideol-
ogy of international law is a notable event in the history of the Court. 5
There have always been doctrinal differences among the
judges-inevitable in a body of judges of different nationalities and
legal systems. Also there have been "progressives" and "conserva-
tives" on the Bench. In the past such labels could be applied to judges
irrespective of their origin, and no doubt in the future the Court will
32. The normal election of 5 new inimbers was held on Oct. 27, 1969.
33. The Assembly was held in Addis Ababa, Sept., 1969.
34. Present regional representation is:
western Europe 4 (U.K., France, Spain, Sweden)
Eastern Europe 2 (U.S.S.R., Poland)
North America I (U.S.)
South America 2 (Uruguay, Mexico)
Africa 3 (Nigeria, Senegal, Dahomey)
Asia 2 (Pakistan, Phillipines)
Middle East I (Lebanon)
35. Since 1946 the Eastern European Socialist bloc has been represented on the Court by
at least two judges, and they generally present a common "ideological" view which differs
sharply from the opinion of the non-socialist majority. Grzybowski, Socialist Judges in the
International Court of Justice, 1964 DUKE L.J. 536-49. Their effect as a group has not been
significant.
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continue to draw individual progressive or conservative judges from
all sides of the political ideological barriers. Until recently, however,
it could be said that the majority ofjudges shared the same basic views
on international law. This is no longer the case.
For some years a trend toward a polarization of basic views on
international law generally has been apparent. The South West Africa
cases reflected this polarization in the Court and were the major cause
of the pre-occupation of Afro-Asian states with the Court's member-
ship. The last election demonstrates that these states, aware of the
importance of this development, were determined to ensure that future
Courts would reflect fully the polarization which has occurred.
The divergence in fundamental views of international law is di-
rectly related to developments in international society and, especially,
the emergence of the General Assembly as a universal forum. The
General Assembly was particularly concerned with human rights and
colonialism, with South African policies in relation to South West
Africa providing the major focus of attention. Much has been written
on the South West Africa Cases, and it is not proposed to consider
them here.36 Some general observations must be made, however, be-
cause they provide an excellent example of the relationship between
political and social developments in the international community and
the emergence of a meaningful "new" international law.
Until the 1966 judgment it could be said that the International
Court's pronouncements on South West Africa, within its general
conservative tradition, reflected the increasing concern of the interna-
tional community with such issues as human rights and individual
freedoms. The Court in 1966 reversed this trend. The Afro-Asian
States agreed-as did some commentators 3"-that the most plausible
explanation for the 1966 judgment was that the effective majority
36. Following advisory opinions from the ICJ in 1950, 1955 and 1956, which confirmed that
S.W. Africa was still a territory under the League of Nations Mandate created in 1920, and
that South Africa's obligations under the Mandate (including the duty to submit to U.N.
supervision of her administration of S.W. Africa) continued, Ethiopia and Liberia applied to
the ICJ to confirm the findings of its advisory opinion in a binding judgment, and to hold further
that South Africa had violated its obligations by, inter alia, introducing apaitheid into S.W.
Africa, establishing military bases there and refusing to submit reports or transmit petitions
from inhabitants to the U.N. The Court, in the Preliminary Objections Phase, held, by 8 votes
to 7 votes, that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute, [1962] I.C.J.
319, 347. In the Second Phase, [19661 I.C.J. 6, the Court held (by the President casting his vote)
that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had a sufficient "legal interest" in the subject matter of their
claims, and the Court was not, therefore, able to decide the merits of the case.
37. See, e.g., Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21 INT'L OROANISATION
1( 967); Reisman, Revision of the South West Africa Cases, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1966)..
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wished simply to reverse the legal assumptions accompanying the
1962 judgment and that the membership of the Court in 1966 was
affected by fortuitous events. From a brief analysis of the membership
situation, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the decision would
have been in favor of Ethiopia and Liberia in "normal" circumstan-
ces. Judge Khan, now President, was disqualified from sitting.38 There
was, and is, no doubt, however, that Judge Khan's personal views on
racial discrimination and on the dynamic role of the Court in interna-
tional law made it unlikely that he would have subscribed to the
conservative view which prevailed in 1966. Judge Badawi of the
U.A.R., who had concurred in the judgment of 1962 dismissing South
Africa's preliminary objections, died pendente lite and his replace-
ment, Judge Ammoun of Lebanon, did not participate. Judge Busta-
mante of Peru was incapacitated by illness. In view of his strong
separate opinion39 in favor of the applicants in 1962, his absence must
be regarded as a major cause of the majority in 1962 becoming a
minority in 1966. The decision in 1966 resulted from the casting of a
vote by the President, Sir Percy Spender of Australia, a leading mem-
ber of the "conservative" faction. If the then Vice President, Welling-
ton Koo, had been President, the decisive vote, if required at all,
would surely have been cast the other way.4"
The immediate reaction of the Afro-Asian bloc and the deter-
mined efforts subsequently to secure a Court more sympathetic to new
international law views is understandable. On a more detached level,
the 1966 judgment must be regarded as marking a decisive juncture
in the life of the Court. The majority decision was based on the
traditional positivistic view of international law while the dissenting
opinions emphasized its teleological character and the function of the
Court in developing law to match developments in international so-
ciety.4 While the present system of triennial elections ensures a rapid
turnover in membership of the Court, as long as present voting proce-
38. The official statement on his disqualification does not disclose the grounds, [1965] I.C.J.
9. Judge Khan was a prominent member of the Pakistani delegation at the U.N. when Pakistan
voted against South Africa on S.W. African affairs, and had been nominated as a judge ad hoc
by Ethiopia and Liberia before his election to the Court. These factors presumably prompted
the President, Sir Percy Spender, to inform him that it would be "unwise, if not improper" for
him to sit. See also Morley, Relative Incompatibility of Functions, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 316,
326 (1970) (and sources quoted in id. n.54).
39. [19621 I.C.J. 349.
40. Vice President Koo delivered a dissenting opinion, [1966] I.C.J. 214.
41. See generally Falk, 21 INT'L ORGANISATION, supra note 37; Reisman, 7 VA. J. INT'L
L., supra note 37.
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dures and patterns of voting in the United Nations remain un-
changed, it is certain that the membership of future Courts will fully
reflect Third World influence. In appropriate cases, therefore, new
international law views may be expected to come to the fore in deci-
sions of the Court.
The latest pronouncement by the Court appears to support this
contention. In the Advisory Opinion on the Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa), delivered on June 21, 1971,42 the Court held: first, by a 13 to
2 vote, that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being
illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administra-
tion from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation
of the Territory; second, by 11 to 4, that states-members of the
United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of
South Africa's presence in Namibia, and the invalidity of its acts on
behalf of or concerning Namibia, and to refrain from any acts and
in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa
implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assis-
tance to, such presence and administration; and, finally, by the same
vote, that it is incumbent upon states which are not members of the
United Nations to give assistance to the United Nations in the action
which has been taken with regard to Namibia. 3
The Court had earlier rejected objections raised by South Africa
against the participation in the proceedings of three members of the
Court.4 On February 8, 1971, when the public sittings opened, the
President dealt with another contention of South Africa that, even if
the Court had competence to deliver the opinion, which South Africa
denied, it should nevertheless, as a matter of judicial propriety, refuse
to give the requested opinion on account of political pressure to which,
it was contended, the Court had been or might be subjected. The
President declared that it would not be proper for the Court to enter-
tain those observations, bearing as they did on the very nature of the
Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, an organ
which in that capacity acts only on the basis of law, independently of
all outside influences or interventions.4" These objections directly im-
42. [1971] I.C.J. 16.
43. Id. at 58.
44. The President, Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Judge Padilla Nervo, and Judge Moro-
zov. The objections to all three were similar to those advanced against Judge Khan in the S.W.
Africa Cases (Second Phase); see note 38 supra.
45. [1971] I.C.J. at 23.
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pugned the integrity of the Court, and the very fact that they were
raised at all should concern the Court and the General Assembly more
than the proposal to amend article 22.46
The conception of the Court as an organ somehow entirely above
politics is naive. The Court is, as the President said, the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, a very political body. What is
now urgently required is a clarification of the relationship between the
Court and the other organs of the U.N.
The Advisory Opinion will no doubt receive detailed analysis and
discussion in due course, but one observation which is relevant to this
article may be made immediately. The Court, in dealing with general
objections to the General Assembly resolution terminating the South
West Africa Mandate (2145 XXI) and the specific contention that the
Assembly had wrongfully assumed judicial functions in this matter,
said:
This is not a finding on facts, but the formulation of a legal situation. For it
would not be correct to assume that, because the General Assembly is in
principle vested with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting in
specific cases within the framework of its competence, resolutions which make
determinations or have operative design. 7
It is submitted that this appears to represent for the first time the
acceptance by the Court, as distinct from individual judges, of the new
international law view of the collectivistic generation of customary
international law. The phrase "formulating a legal situation" ex-
presses perfectly the process whereby the General Assembly manifests
the juridical conscience of the international community.
The formulation of the legal situation in relation to South West
Africa was an easy task. The underlying issue, racial discrimination,
was one in which it was possible to demonstrate near-unanimity in the
juridical conscience of the nations. The General Assembly and the
Security Council, as well as other international bodies, by overwhelm-
ing majorities had condemned racial discrimination on numerous oc-
46. This is of course not the first time that the Court has been accused of partiality and the
judges have many times been suspected of following the political views of their own govern-
ments. For a full discussion and refutation of these allegations and an earlier full examination
of political factors and the Court, see Anand, The International Court of Justice and
Impartiality Between Nations, 12 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L AFF. (1963). Such allegations have gener-
ally been made by commentators on individual decisions rather than by parties in the course of
proceedings, and as Anand said, governments on the losing side generally refrain from impugn-
ing the integrity of the Court's motives.
47. [197 ] I.C.J. at 50 (emphasis added).
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casions. 8 The Court in an advisory opinion in 1950 had confirmed
the international status of South West Africa, as well as South Af-
rica's obligation to submit to the supervision of the General Assembly
in its administration of the territory.4" If the minority of the Court
had prevailed in 1966, it is clear that the judgment would have em-
phasized the existence of an objective international standard or crite-
rion as an aid to interpretation of the mandate. Such a standard could
be utilized to measure objectively whether the practice of apartheid
in the mandated territory of South West Africa was a violation of
the mandatory's obligation "to promote to the utmost the material
and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the
territory.""5 The juridical conscience of the nations, or what Judge
Tanaka called the collectivistic generation of international customary
law,5' would have been accepted as a basis for decision. Five years of
further international social and political development, and a Court
whose composition fully reflected that development, ensured its ac-
ceptance in* 1971.
The degree of unanimity which exists in the international com-
munity on the subject of racial discrimination hardly exists on any
other subject. Even if one accepts Judge Alvarez's view that the Inter-
national Court is the "most authoritative organ for the expression of
the juridical conscience, ' '5 2 the Court must first find the existence of
such conscience on the question before it. That is the major problem
confronting the Court and the advocates of new international law.
Although great principles may originate in the legal conscience of
peoples, they must, to have value, said Judge Alvarez, be expressed
by authorized bodies like diplomatic assemblies, the International
Law Commission, or the International Court.5 3 The U.N. General
Assembly is accorded a pre-eminent place among these bodies.5" Op-
ponents of this view point to the obvious political character of many
resolutions of the General Assembly. 5 Where resolutions conflict with
interests which were created or developed under the protection of
48. For an enumeration of the various resolutions, declarations and conventions, see S.W.
Africa Cases (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6,292-93 (dissenting opinion of Tanaka, J.).
49. Advisory Opinion on International Status of S.W. Africa, [1950] I.C.J. 128.
50. [1966] I.C.J. at 433 (dissenting opinion ofJessup, J.).
51. Id. at 294.
52. [1948] I.C.J, 69.
53. [1951] I.C.J. 148-49.
54. [1954] I.C.J. 71.
55. See, e.g., Cheng, 1954 Y.B. WORLD AFF., supra note 27.
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traditional international law, their legislative character is strongly
denied. Indeed if one were to search for the existence of a juridical
conscience in the General Assembly on many of the current issues in
international law, one would search in vain, thereby giving justifica-
tion for the assessment that "[t]here simply is not an advanced inter-
national society, no subordination of particular interests to common
values, no sense of solidarity."56 If this essential basis of the new
international law does not exist, how can the International Court
respond to the necessity for the substitution of a new international law
for the system of European origin that at present exists? A simple
descent into the political arena of the General Assembly is clearly
untenable. The Court on several occasions has stressed that it is not
part of its judicial function to submit matters before it to any form
of political treatment. 7 But the Court has also accepted the proposi-
tion that international law is influenced by changes in international
society 8 and what is required at the present time is a reconciliation
between the positivistic emphasis on individual consent of states in
international law and the new international law emphasis on the
collective formulation of customary law. An amendment of article 38
could effect this reconciliation.
Article 38 and Individualism and Collectivism in International Custo-
mary Law
The Court, in deciding disputes in accordance with international
law, is required to apply "international custom as evidence of a gen-
eral practice accepted as law."59 In the orthodox view the essential
constitutive requirement of a rule of customary international law is
the fact of a constant and uniform practice among states, accompa-
nied by a subjective sense that observance of the practice is obligatory,
opinio juris sive necessitatis.1 The Court has hitherto adopted a re-
56. Samore, The New International Law of Alejandro Alvarez, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 41, 54
(1958).
57. S. ROSENNE, supra note 5, at 91.
58. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174, 178.
59. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.1.(b).
60. I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17 (1965). 1 L. OPPENHEII, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 26 (8th ed. 1955). For the formulation of the requirements of a customary rule by the
International Court, see the Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266, 276-77.
Some writers deny the necessity for the subjective requirement. See, e.g., GUGGENHEIM, ETUDES
FN I'IIONNEUR DE GEORGES SCELLE 1.275-80 (1950).
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strictive interpretation of article 38.1 .(b) by emphasizing the necessity
for evidence that the particular state in question has accepted an
alleged customary rule as law.' Thus, for example, in the Fisheries
Case"2 it was possible for Norway to demonstrate that she was not
bound by an alleged rule because she had always opposed it. 3
On the general question, however, of the Court's obligation to
apply "international custom as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law" there is clearly scope for the Court to develop interna-
tional law. The formulation and modification of customary law is an
evolutionary matter, and there have always been areas in interna-
tional law where it was difficult to distinguish the point where argu-
ments de lege ferenda had ceased, and it was possible to speak of a
custom de lege lata. At present, this familiar conflict is often con-
ducted within the "traditional" and "new" international law dichot-
omy, and it is at this point that the International Court in appropriate
cases can and must reconcile "individualism" and "collectivism" in
international law. It is at this point also that the essential interrela-
tionship between international law and international politics must be
utilized. If the Court is to develop its role in international law, it must
adopt a more positive attitude toward the new community source of
rules of international law which will require a descent into the political
arena. This is not to say that decisions of the Court must henceforth
be based on political or ideological considerations. Rosenne expressed
the true position:
In thus postulating the existence of a political function, it is not implied that
the Court subjects, or ought to subject, the matters submitted to it to any form
of political treatment and reach its decisions on opportunistic grounds or those
of expediency, although that is not to say that the members of the International
Court, as the judges of any domestic court, are expected to remain indifferent
to prevailing trends and requirements of the Society which has charged them
with judicial functions. 5
The political function which the Court must fulfill in the era of new
international law is not dissimilar to the political function which
municipal courts fulfill in municipal legal systems. It is no doubt
largely true that the sentiment of solidarity-the foundation of the
61. Rights of Nationals of the U.S. in Morocco Case, [19521 I.C.J. 176, 199; Fisheries Case,
[1951] I.C.J. 116, 131; Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [19501 I.C.J. 266, 276.
62. [1951] I.C.J. 116, 131.
63. See I G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 319-23 (3d ed. 1957).
64. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 20.
65. S. ROSENNE, supra note 5, at 90-91.
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house of new international law that Alvarez built-is absent in con-
temporary international society." But there is a substantial element
of homogeneity in that society; there has emerged a degree of coopera-
tion to achieve agreed purposes; and there is near-universal agreement
on some important basic issues. 7 The problems in international so-
ciety-the struggle for economic development by under-developed
nations, and the battle for international justice by oppressed
groups-are paralleled in the history of municipal legal systems."
Many of these problems can only be solved by international con-
ventions or by existing or new international institutions of a global
or regional character. The judicial process, whether in municipal or
international law, is not the primary vehicle for major legal or institu-
tional reforms. Judicial decisions do, however, play a vital part in the
interpretation and development of existing law, and may provide a
primary "law-making" source in important areas where legislation
is unsuitable or impracticable. The International Court of Justice
cannot exempt itself from fulfilling these functions. The Court, if it
is to remain a credible international tribunal, must distill from the
political maneuvering and propaganda in organs such as the United
Nations the genuine juridical conscience of the nations which has
always been the real substratum of international customary law.
As has been observed,69 manifestations of juridical conviction
occur in all manner of ways, and it is only when formulated by a judge
or a jurist that these manifestations become articulate. The task of
the Court must henceforth be to formulate rules of international law
from the various manifestations of juridical conviction in diplomatic
assemblies. "To await their final and conscious adoption by govern-
mental authorities before deciding that lexferenda has become lex lata
is to impose on international law an unnecessary and frustrating hal-
ter."70
The formulation of new rules of international law by the Court is
66. Samore, 52 Am. J. INT'L L., supra note 56, at 54.
67. The resolutions of the General Assembly, cited above at notes 22-25, provide evidence
of this.
68. Examples of the struggle by trade unions to secure legal recognition include the efforts
in the U.S. to secure civil rights for Negroes.
69. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 60, at 21.
70. Id.
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an established and accepted practice." This creative function has been
exercised within the traditional framework of the generation of custo-
mary law by an individualistic process. What is now required is the
overt acceptance by the Court of the existence of a new frame-
work-the generation of customary international law by a collectivis-
tic process. The collectivistic process in question is essentially a
political process involving the method of parliamentary diplomacy. It
is true that much of the law generated in this way is quickly trans-
formed into multilateral conventions. The task of the Court in this
event is relatively easy and involves no departure from settled princi-
ples of interpretation and application of treaties.
It is also possible to argue 72 that the Court may apply directly, as
international custom, particular "rules" that have emerged from the
proceedings of international organizations. But a direct attempt to
subsume this situation under article 38.1.(b), "international custom,
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law," presents some
difficulties. Not the least of these is that states which could demon-
strate express rejection of the alleged new rule, by consistent contrary
votes or declarations in international assemblies, could presumably
rely on previous decisions of the International Court which empha-
sized the non-applicability of a customary rule against a State which
could show consistent opposition to it. 73
It seems preferable to adopt the indirect and more detached
method of abstracting the juridical conscience and to allow the Court
to formulate the new rule. Where appropriate, the formulation of the
new rule may include the abrogation of an old rule where "the mani-
festation of juridical conviction" indicates rejection of the old rule.
There is little danger that the Court will fail to distinguish between
"instant" customary law born of politically expedient majority reso-
lutions of international organizations and manifestations of genuine
juridical conviction. The distinction between isolated resolutions,
adopted perhaps by a narrow majority, and a series of resolutions,
adopted unanimously or with minimal opposition, is obviously rele-
vant here and would no doubt be used by the Court in its search for
71. For a convenient summary of the impressive contributions made by the Court toward
the clarification and development of international law over a period of 20 years, see Cheng, 1966
Y.B. OF WORLD AFF. 241,245.
72. See, e.g., S.W. Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 4,291-92 (dissenting opinion of Tanaka, J.).
73. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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the juridical conscience of nations.74
In performing this task, the Court will have to consider all facets
of international society including international politics. It may be
necessary to formulate rules primarily in the light of political prefer-
ences.7 5 If the function of the International Court is essentially similar
to that of municipal courts, the exercise of some political discretion
in the decision of cases in international law must be accepted. 7 To
deny such discretion to judges of the International Court in contem-
porary international law is to ensure the irrelevance of the interna-
tional community's highest judicial tribunal. Unless, however, the
Statute of the Court is amended to incorporate this function of the
Court by formally including the collectivistic generation of customary
international law in article 38, critics of the Court and states-parties
to cases before it will feel justified in objecting to the Court on
grounds of its political partiality and subjection to political pressures.
Summary and Conclusion
It may well be that the proposed change in the seat of the Court
has little meaning. Irrespective of a change in the Court's location, it
is submitted that article 38 should be amended to provide unequivo-
cally for the collective generation of customary international law as
one of the sources of the law which the Court may apply. The Court
can no longer always apply traditional international law, with its
origin in the Europe of Grotius, in a near-universal community of
states divided into various ideological blocs.
It is an over-simplification to dismiss recent events concerning the
Court as "merely" political or to assert that many new states simply
reject entirely European based international law. The dissatisfaction
of the Third World with some existing concepts and rules is based on
74. Judge Tanaka explained the distinction:
Of course, we cannot admit that individual resolutions, declarations, judgments, deci-
sions, etc., have binding force upon the members of the organization. What is required
for customary international law is the repetition of the same practice; accordingly, in
this case resolutions, declarations, etc., on the same matter in the same, or diverse,
organizations must take place repeatedly. [1966] I.C.J. 4, 292.
75. R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 9 (1963).
76. This involves acceptance of the postulate that municipal courts and judges perform a
political function in helping to regulate the social distribution of values. See generally M.
KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961), cited
by R. HIGGINS, supra note 75, at 8.
Vol. 1972:407]
426 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1972:407
the reasonable claim that international law must reflect a consensus
of the new world community. In some fields "old" international law
is incompatible with the new world order. The International Court
should explicitly accept this fact and assist in formulating the rules
of the new international law which finds its origin in the juridical
conscience of the nations of the world.
Unless the Court does so, the very limited number of cases which
presently comes before the Court will dwindle to nothing. There is
more danger for the Court in a charge of irrelevancy in contemporary
international society than in fears that its prestige will be diminished
by a descent into politics. Unless it accepts the hazards involved in
such descent, it will fail to bridge the gap between old and new interna-
tional law, and it will have failed in its function as the principal judi-
cial organ of the international community.
